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I. Introduction
The 2003 invasion of Iraq exposed chal-lenges in accurately assessing a state’s
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) ca-
pabilities, and seemed to validate the con-
cerns of those who oppose a broad right of
preemptive self-defense. The United States
and Britain justified their invasion of Iraq
by citing prior U.N. Security Council res-
olutions and Iraq’s material breaches of its
duties under them.1 But the aftermath has
left open an important international legal
question: assuming authority for preemp-
tive self-defense exists in some circum-
stances, how certain should a state have to
be in its assessment that another hostile
state has or is acquiring WMD to justify
the use of preemptive force?2 The question
is crucial as the international community
confronts and deliberates about future
challenges, including Iran’s alleged nuclear
program.3 As massively destructive tech-
nologies and know-how continue to spread,
international standoffs are likely to con-
tinue—be they with Iran or North Korea
or other states. Policymakers aiming to dis-
arm an opponent believed to be holding or
building WMD will continue to face un-
certainty about the true extent and nature
of an adversary’s alleged WMD programs.
During the 2008 presidential campaign,
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then-candidate Barack Obama stated:
“Sometimes, the preventive use of force
may be necessary, but rarely. The experi-
ence of Iraq underscores that often, per-
ceived threats are not as real [as] they may
seem, and our intelligence may be imper-
fect. But, when our intelligence is good and
defensible we should not rule out the use of
force.”4 This chapter examines ways of as-
sessing legally whether that intelligence is
sufficiently good and defensible.
The problem of imperfect intelligence
about adversary capabilities is hardly new.
As political scientist Robert Jervis observes:
“Much of the history of international politics
can be written in terms of intelligence fail-
ures, starting with the report in the Bible
that the spies that Moses sent to the Land of
Israel overestimated the strength of the en-
emies to be found there.”5 But the special
challenges of suspected WMD arsenals have
prompted calls from several directions for
the international legal regime to adapt to
the strategic context of WMD proliferation.
The current use-of-force debate involves
several camps. The first, which I term the
“unilateralist school”—most notably rep-
resented by the administration of former
President George W. Bush—defends uni-
lateral decisions to use self-defensive force
in the face of perceived WMD threats, even
in the face of substantial uncertainty as to
the timing and maturation of the threat.6
The second, which I term the “strict con-
structionist school”—those who read the
U.N. Charter’s self-defense provision most
narrowly—holds that states cannot resort
to force absent U.N. Security Council au-
thorization unless attacked first, except per-
haps in very narrow circumstances where a
specifically identified attack is “imminent.”
Both schools share a belief that the prolif-
eration of WMD poses new challenges for
international use of force rules, but they
draw opposite conclusions. The unilateral-
ists believe the instantaneity and destruc-
tiveness of WMD threats mean states can
no longer be expected to wait for the U.N.
Security Council to deliberate or for immi-
nent threats to manifest clearly. Strict con-
structionists believe that the spread of
WMD raises the danger of too lenient a
standard for precautionary use of force be-
cause relaxing the standard may open the
door to masked aggression, spur more states
to pursue WMD as deterrents, or create
security instabilities.
Within this polarized debate exists a third
view, which I develop further and defend.
The objective “reasonable necessity” school
holds that the use of force against another
state believed to pose a WMD threat is jus-
tified when a reasonable state would con-
clude a WMD threat is sufficiently likely
and severe that forceful measures are nec-
essary. Whereas both the strict construc-
tionists and the unilateralists emphasize the
question of who—or which international
actors—decides when conditions warrant-
ing force are satisfied, the reasonable ne-
cessity school emphasizes the substantive
standards that should govern.
This chapter examines how these com-
peting legal approaches deal with unavoid-
able limitations with respect to alleged
WMD capabilities and programs, especially
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nuclear ones, though the “schools” to which
I refer are actually segments of a spectrum,
not so neatly separable and with much nu-
anced variation within them. The focus of
this chapter is states, not terrorist groups,
though some of the insights are applicable
in that context as well.
In the past, a key issue for international
legal doctrine was assessing whether an ad-
versary state intended to attack. Military ca-
pabilities could often be assumed or assessed
with a relatively high level of certainty, but
the community of states needed rules or
processes for adjudicating whether uncer-
tain intentions warranted forceful preemp-
tive or anticipatory responses. Of course,
the problem of accurately assessing adver-
sary intentions remains as well, and those
intentions continue to form critical com-
ponents of any use-of-force legal analysis.7
Moreover, the dual military-civilian uses of
many potentially destructive technologies
makes it even harder to divorce an analysis
of hostile capabilities from the intentions
that might lie behind them. Thus contem-
porary crises involving hostile states that
are seeking WMD pose questions of both
intention and capability, and often the mere
crossing (or perceived crossing) of the
WMD capability threshold has dire and
sudden security and stability consequences.
This chapter argues that a sound legal doc-
trinal approach must be able to operate ef-
fectively in that “capability uncertainty”
environment.
In terms of legal approaches, the current
debate fits a familiar pattern. The unilater-
alist school generally deals with uncertainty
over capability with a subjective, or self-de-
termined standard: the state contemplating
the use of force to head off a WMD threat
must believe in good faith that the use of
force is necessary to forestall it. This school
accepts as inevitable that states must and
will make critical decisions amid substan-
tial uncertainty. The strict constructionist
school generally emphasizes process in
dealing with capability uncertainty.17 It ar-
gues that because accurately discerning a
state’s capability is difficult, the interna-
tional community should rely on collective
decisionmaking, based as much as possible
on assessments by multilateral bodies like
the U.N. Security Council and the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to de-
termine the existence and magnitude of
threats. The reasonable necessity school pro-
poses flexible yet objective criteria to guide
decisionmaking about military force, usually
through a combination of state practice and
international institutional adjudication.
This chapter explains how an objective
reasonable necessity approach to WMD ca-
pability assessments can serve long-term
peace and security objectives and, more
specifically, how the law governing use of
force might evolve to guide capability as-
sessments. A reasonable necessity approach,
combined with an objective standard of as-
sessing WMD capability and operating as a
narrow legal alternative to formal U.N. Se-
curity Council authorization, can best bal-
ance and allocate competing risks in an
environment of significant capability uncer-
tainty. However, U.N. Security Council-
driven processes and an objective necessity
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approach are not mutually exclusive. They
can be combined in reciprocally reinforcing
ways. Moreover, the substantive evidentiary
issues forced to the surface through objec-
tive reasonableness analysis are critical to
managing some of the dangers of operating
outside explicit U.N. Security Council au-
thority, and are critical to the effective op-
eration of the legal processes that the strict
constructionists advocate.
II. Use of Force Doctrine and
Weapons of Mass Destruction
The basic policy behind internationalself-defense doctrine is to promote
global order by permitting states sufficient
leeway to respond to expected security
threats—including taking steps to protect
themselves prior to an actual attack—while
not creating an exception so broad to the
baseline prohibition of force that it swallows
the rule, or is used pretextually to mask ag-
gression.8 As the influential eighteenth-cen-
tury Swiss diplomat and legal scholar
Emmerich Vattel explained, “We must . . .
have good grounds to think ourselves
threatened by [another power], before we
can lawfully have recourse to arms. Now
power alone does not threaten an injury—
it must be accompanied by the will. . . .”
However, “[w]hen once a state has given
proofs of injustice, rapacity, pride, ambition,
or an imperious thirst of rule, she becomes
an object of suspicion to her neighbours,
whose duty it is to stand on their guard
against her.”9
Because the policy involves predicting
future actions by an expected aggressor, ap-
plication of anticipatory self-defense doc-
trine, or what more broadly could be called
“precautionary self-defense” doctrines (as
explained below), risks false positives and
false negatives.10 “The problem with re-
course to anticipatory self-defense,” ob-
served the great international law scholar
Thomas Franck, “is its ambiguity. In the
right circumstances, it can be a prescient
measure that, at low cost, extinguishes the
fuse of a powder-keg. In the wrong circum-
stances, it can cause the very calamity it an-
ticipates.”11 Precautionary self-defense rules
aim to calibrate the right balance of risks
among false positives and false negatives.
The classic formulation of anticipatory
self-defense doctrine remains that articu-
lated in 1841 by Secretary of State Daniel
Webster, who argued that a right of antici-
patory self-defense arises only when there
is a necessity of self-defense that is “instant,
overwhelming, and leaving no choice of
means, and no moment for deliberation”—
criteria that have been widely subsumed
into the concept of “imminence.”12 To the
majority of scholars, the existence of an im-
minent threat defines a narrow category of
the inherent right of self-defense, which
U.N. Charter Article 51 recognizes as an
exception to the general prohibition on the
use of force (the other legal justification for
force is authorization by the U.N. Security
Council).
This imminence requirement helps ensure
that a defender exhaust other, non-forcible
means, and reduces the likelihood of erro-
neous judgments, insofar as waiting until the
4
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point at which an attack is about to occur
helps expose an adversary’s true intentions.
An imminence requirement therefore helps
distinguish an adversary’s general attitude
of hostility from a maturated intention to
attack.
The proliferation of WMD complicates
the anticipatory self-defense debate, how-
ever, by frustrating aspects of the traditional
imminence formulation and raising the
stakes in the event of an error. Especially in
the hands of a hostile state, WMD capabil-
ities can pose threats that are very different
from the class of threats out of which the
imminence requirement grew. Traditional
imminence depends heavily on a temporal
restriction, in which force is only permitted
“during the last window of opportunity.”13
The technological nature of WMD and
their delivery can make it impossible to dis-
cern this “last window” period, limiting the
extent to which the imminence requirement
can be used to reduce uncertainty about a
WMD-armed adversary’s true intentions.
In a conventional context, a state’s decision
to attack in order to achieve a major effect
usually (though certainly not always) was
accompanied by a mobilization of forces
large enough to be perceptible. A WMD
attack could become imminent merely with
the crystallization of the aggressor’s in-
tent.14 The lack of an intentions-signaling
mobilization period, combined with these
weapons’ catastrophic potential and the
limits of protective means after an attack
has commenced, severely restricts the op-
portunities for self-defense afforded by the
traditional concept of imminence.
Indeed, the dangers of WMD possession
become “imminent” not only immediately
prior to an attack, but often before a hostile
state even completes its WMD develop-
ment. Mere possession can create serious
security dangers, by acting as a shield for
other forms of aggression and destabilizing
regional security balances.15 WMD-armed
states may be increasingly tempted to em-
ploy conventional or asymmetric force to
achieve goals, including supporting terror-
ism or insurgencies, under a deterrent um-
brella. All this effectively shifts a substantial
portion of contemporary security risks out-
side the ambit of traditional imminence,
and so diminishes the self-defensive value
of the principle.
One might immediately object that loos-
ening the imminence requirement conflates
several distinct legal and strategic concepts:
anticipatory, preemptive, and preventive
force. Indeed this is deliberate, and I use the
inclusive term “precautionary self-defense”
to denote the broad range of decisions to
use force to forestall expected dangers be-
fore an actual attack. Because WMD often
can be used without warning, it is difficult
to distinguish clearly between “distant” and
“imminent” threats, and so between pre-
vention and preemption. Moreover, all three
legal approaches I compare below implicitly
contemplate the possibility of the preemp-
tive or preventive use of force (i.e. prior to
the point of imminent attack). Their differ-
ence is in how they seek to legally regulate
the accompanying decisionmaking, and
even more specifically, to measure a com-
ponent of the necessary legal conditions: by
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demanding process versus good faith versus
reasonableness in reaching judgments.
Strategic context is critical to evaluating
this debate, however, and a lesson of the
past few decades—one displayed dramati-
cally in recent years—is that information
about an adversary or rogue state’s WMD
capability is often highly uncertain or in-
complete and that intelligence assessments
of these capabilities often carry large prob-
abilities of error. Accordingly, one of the
principal challenges facing national security
decisionmakers will likely not be what to
do about a hostile adversary that has WMD,
but what to do about a hostile adversary
that might have WMD.
The most obvious examples of this prob-
lem are the intelligence assessments pre-
ceding the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the
dogged uncertainty that surrounds Iran’s
nuclear programs, as well as the details and
extent of North Korea’s. However, prior
history is replete with examples of states
both overestimating and underestimating
WMD capabilities.16 Israel’s 1981 assess-
ment that Iraq was very close to achieving
an operational nuclear arsenal prompted
Israel to bomb Osiraq in Iraq. Contempo-
rary and later analyses viewed that as over-
estimation.17 Following the 1991 Persian
Gulf War, the United States and the inter-
national community more broadly discov-
ered that they had vastly underestimated
Iraq’s progress toward a nuclear weapon
capability.18 In 1998, the United States gov-
ernment was caught off guard by India’s
test of a nuclear weapon.19
After the invasion of Iraq, the Commis-
sion on the Intelligence Capabilities of the
United States Regarding Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD Commission) con-
cluded that the U.S. and international abil-
ity to detect and accurately assess WMD
capabilities are, and will remain, limited.20
Another major study concluded that “[i]n
the Iraqi case, arguably the three best intel-
ligence services in the world—those of the
United States, Great Britain, and Israel—
proved tragically unequal to the task” of
providing accurate intelligence on emerg-
ing threats.21
The problem of capability uncertainty is
unlikely to abate in the foreseeable future,
and it may intensify.22 The dual-use nature
of many WMD technologies and the dif-
fuse, closely-guarded structure of WMD
programs pose a formidable challenge for
monitoring and appraisal efforts. Inspection
and verification mechanisms suffer from a
number of impairments, ranging from de-
pendence on the compliance of potential
proliferators to inadequate technological
resources to limited mandates. The most
capable national intelligence services are
hampered by a number of systemic defi-
ciencies, the correction of which is likely to
be a slow and difficult process. Moreover,
even the best reforms are heavily limited in
their ability to eliminate all information
gaps and erroneous predications.
The Iraq experience also highlights the
ability of suspect regimes to take steps—like
foiling inspections—to hide evidence of
WMD or dual-use capabilities, deliberately
disrupting other states’ and international
organizations’ ability to make accurate ca-
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pability assessments. Furthermore, suspect
regimes may posture (including by rejecting
inspections) to exaggerate their WMD ca-
pacity in the eyes of regional rivals.23
As a result, we can no longer expect the
same certainty reflected in then-U.S. Am-
bassador to the U.N. Adlai Stevenson’s
October 1962 presentation to both the
U.N. Security Council and a live television
audience of “incontrovertible” photographic
evidence of Soviet missiles being assembled
in Cuba. Instead, we are more likely to see
shades of inconclusiveness, like that of for-
mer Secretary of State Colin Powell when
he presented to the U.N. Security Council
forty years later circumstantial evidence
suggesting Iraq was likely—though not
certain—to have a WMD arsenal.
As mentioned earlier, this issue of “capa-
bility uncertainty” is a recently exacerbated
challenge for anticipatory or precautionary
self-defense doctrine, because in an era of
conventional warfare among states, an ad-
versary’s first-strike capability could often
be assumed or assessed with high confi-
dence. True, the history of modern con-
ventional warfare is also rife with examples
of intelligence gaps concerning adversary
capabilities and resultant strategic sur-
prises.24 But contemporary WMD capabil-
ity uncertainty greatly complicates strategic
planning and induces insecurity not only
because of the magnitude of doubt—what
is the probability that a state has or is about
to have WMD?—but because that state’s
crossing the WMD threshold has the po-
tential to so radically alter the balance of
power.25
Before proceeding, it is important to note
this chapter’s analytic assumption of hostile
intentions of a given state believed to be ac-
quiring WMD. While the threat posed by a
WMD-armed or WMD-arming state is a
composite of its intentions and its capabili-
ties, this chapter focuses on the capability
assessment variable. To this end, I assume a
requisite assessment of hostile or destabiliz-
ing intentions, i.e. that if the suspect state
had WMD it would wield them in hostile
ways. To be very clear: I am not arguing that
the mere possession or pursuit of WMD is
sufficient legal cause for precautionary force.
In the end, this assumption highlights the
difficulty of ever truly analytically de-linking
intentions and capability, but it helps bring
into focus the special legal challenges posed
by limited WMD intelligence.
III. Three Approaches
International law helps regulate uses offorce in ways that both guide decision-
making and enhance its legitimacy: by per-
mitting the beneficial use of force and
constraining its harmful use, and by chan-
neling key international actors’ opinion ac-
cording to consistent principles and
processes. The uncertainty of intelligence
about WMD capabilities means that good
faith convictions among some decisionmak-
ers may look like reckless misjudgments to
others. The strict constructionist view, the
unilateralist view, and the reasonable ne-
cessity view each offer different solutions
to this problem, rooted in different assump-
tions about international relations and the
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impact of WMD proliferation on national
and international security.
While the stakes may be uniquely high in
contemplating force against WMD threats,
the problem of accurately assessing a factual
premise that is key to adjudicating legal au-
thority is a very common one. Three ap-
proaches to judging disputed issues of fact,
are common throughout domestic and in-
ternational law, and they correspond to the
three major schools of precautionary self-
defense: process (strict constructionist view),
subjective standards (unilateralist view), and
objective standards (reasonable necessity
view). Consider, as an example, possible legal
approaches to determining a police officer’s
authority to search a home for criminal ac-
tivity: one based on obtaining authorization
from a magistrate, or process; one based
on the officer’s state of mind and purposes,
or subjective standards; and one based on
guidelines for a reasonable officer in that
position, or objective standards. All three
promise to effectively calibrate the appro-
priate level of force in the international
system (allowing enough force to deal effec-
tively with genuine threats but not so much
as to threaten peace and stability), and to do
so consistent with a normative vision of au-
thoritative legal rules.
The Strict Constructionist School: The strict
constructionist view holds that the threat
of WMD strengthens the need to interpret
anticipatory self-defense requirements nar-
rowly. It retains a strict imminence require-
ment for anticipatory self-defense and,
absent an imminent or actual armed attack,
makes the U.N. Security Council sole ar-
biter of the legality of other uses of force.26
Compared to alternative views, strict con-
structionists weigh the harms of false posi-
tives (uses of force in self-defense that were
not actually necessary) as relatively high.
As the U.N. High-level Panel on Threats,
Challenges and Change argued, “[I]n a
world full of perceived potential threats,
the risk to the global order and the norm of
non-intervention on which it continues to
be based is simply too great for the legality
of unilateral preventive action, as distinct
from collectively endorsed action, to be ac-
cepted.”27 Of particular concern to advo-
cates of the strict constructionist view is
the risk of “pretextual” false positives, or
states’ representing a use of force as justified
by legitimate considerations when in fact it
is rooted in impermissible motivations.28
The strict constructionist view generally
assumes a model of state behavior that is
highly responsive to multilateral process,
international organizations, and legal norms;
and that holds out great hope for stability
through international cooperation and con-
sensus building. The strict constructionist
view also reflects skepticism of military
force and intervention, and a predisposition
to non-violent methods of conflict resolu-
tion. Accordingly, holders of this view also
have high confidence in the capacity of the
U.N. Security Council to resolve crises.29
As the U.N. High-level Panel noted in re-
sponse to concerns about the restrictiveness
of the strict constructionist view: “if there
are good arguments for preventive military
action, with good evidence to support
them, they should be put to the Security
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Council, which can authorize such action
if it chooses to.”30
As to the problem of capability uncer-
tainty—at the heart of this chapter—the
strict constructionist view relies heavily on
a process approach for judging threats capa-
bilities, including factual premises such as
state capability. Under the strict construc-
tionist view, the U.N. Security Council is
the multilateral body charged with making
the capability assessments incident to de-
termining the existence of threats to inter-
national peace and security sufficient to
justify the use of military force.31 These ca-
pability assessments are in turn informed by
a number of auxiliary multilateral processes,
both from within the U.N. system and from
interlocking and subsidiary treaties and
multilateral organizations. For example, the
Board of Governors of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, in the course of
verifying its safeguards and the obligations
imposed by overlapping treaties such as the
Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Addi-
tional Protocol, reports any determinations
of non-compliance to the U.N. Security
Council, which can then take a range of ac-
tions, including mandating further proce-
dures by the IAEA.32
Some argue that these multilateral
processes have deliberative advantages that
increase decisionmaking accuracy by reduc-
ing the risks of error inherent in unilateral
assessments of proliferators’ capabilities.
Under this view, U.N. Security Council de-
liberation will facilitate information ex-
changes that improve capability appraisals
and temper states’ tendency to “worst-case”
their estimations—both worthy aims.33
Others emphasize the importance of le-
gitimacy in reaching joint, common as-
sessments of threats through multilateral
processes.34 This legitimacy facilitates in-
ternational cooperation on nonproliferation
by reducing proliferators’ options for eva-
sion and promoting the coalescence of in-
ternational public opinion.
Beyond any legitimacy or deliberative
advantages of the U.N. Security Council
assessment process, there is a broader ar-
gument rooted in the strict constructionists’
understanding of the underlying purpose
of use of force law and how international
actors operate within it. For strict construc-
tionists—always wary of the unilateral ap-
plication of legal standards—one danger of
capability uncertainty is that states will at-
tempt to exploit this ambiguity to justify
impermissible uses of force. This reasoning
is also consistent with the strict construc-
tionists’ relatively greater concern with false
positives. If false positives are more dan-
gerous than false negatives, and capability
uncertainty increases the risk of both, a
sensible approach to the problem of capa-
bility uncertainty might focus on mitigating
the heightened problem of false positives
through procedural checks.
One must question, however, whether
this approach also effectively handles the
danger of false negatives—especially in a
world of capability uncertainty. At the time
of the U.N. Charter’s inception, states could
discern imminent threats more easily, par-
ticularly because these threats were often
accompanied by an observable large-scale
9
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mobilization of conventional forces.35 Since
the ability to respond to an imminent threat
now offers much more limited protection
and U.N. Security Council authorization to
use force is the only other recourse under
the strict constructionist view, the U.N.
Security Council assumes a proportionally
expanded role in making the capability as-
sessments that can support self-defensive
action.
The U.N. Security Council voting sys-
tem has a structural inclination towards un-
derestimation of threats and weighting false
positives more strongly than false negatives,
because its voting rules effectively require a
threatened state to present evidence that
satisfies the Permanent-5 member with the
highest evidentiary standards.36 Even under
ideal assumptions of good faith voting based
on collective interests, it is questionable
whether the most exacting epistemic stan-
dards employed by a Permanent-5 member
represent the appropriate evidentiary
threshold for calibrating the use of force
under capability uncertainty, unless the
danger of false positives truly dwarfs the
danger of false negatives. Historically, this
assumption of voting based on collective
rather than narrow national interest has
proven at best suspect; the evidentiary stan-
dards used by the most demanding Perma-
nent-5 member to evaluate potentially
threatening capabilities may owe their rigor
to considerations unrelated to the goal of
accurately discerning the existence of a
threat, such as the expected benefits of its
bilateral relationship with the threatening
state, especially as relations with other Se-
curity Council powers erode. The U.N. Se-
curity Council’s standardless and secluded
decisionmaking makes “policing” this kind
of behavior nearly impossible.
In practice, these structural features tend
to restrict the range of capability evidence
that will be germane to a U.N. Security
Council authorization of force. Given the
predominance of the Permanent-5 member
with the highest evidentiary threshold and
the absence of coordinating standards, the
conclusions of multilateral auxiliary proc -
esses (like IAEA reports) will tend to be-
come the de facto basis for U.N. Security
Council capability assessments.37 But this
heavy reliance on auxiliary processes for as-
sessing capabilities can create counter -
productive incentives for proliferators to
confound and otherwise “game” these
processes, preventing the satisfaction of a
legal condition precedent to the use of pre-
cautionary self-defensive force.
As to the legitimacy advantages of the
strict constructionist approach, a counter-
vailing concern is the divergence between
how threatened states and the U.N. Secu-
rity Council assess threats under capability
uncertainty, which in turn is rooted in the
different interests of threatened states and
strict constructionists. If a state strongly
believes it faces an actual WMD threat and
has formed this belief through a reliable
evidentiary assessment, but is unable to ob-
tain the U.N. Security Council’s blessing
to use force, its leaders are unlikely to ac-
cept inaction as a sacrifice necessary to pre-
vent future false positives and preserve the
norm of nonintervention. This problem is
10
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aggravated by the absence of transparent
criteria to guide the U.N. Security Coun-
cil’s threat assessments. Strict construction-
ists hope these concerns can be mitigated
through improved procedures and greater
political commitment toward their collec-
tive use by powerful states. But the recent
practice of states suggests there is a long
way to go before states can place their pre-
cautionary security largely in the hands of
collective decisionmaking bodies.
The Unilateralist School: The unilateralist
view offers an alternative approach, based
on the belief that in a world of proliferating
WMD, states have a right to use self-
 defensive force against some states that have,
or will soon have, WMD capabilities—even
absent identifiable plans for imminent at-
tack.38 This view jettisons the traditional
imminence requirement on the grounds that
in the context of WMD, responsible states
cannot wait until specific and immediate
threats materialize. Unilateralists seek to ex-
pand self-defensive latitude against non-im-
minent WMD threats because they believe
a narrower rule skews risk too much against
false positives; the risk of false negatives
(failing to use self-defensive force in the face
of potential danger) is too great in the
WMD context.39 As then-National Security
Advisor Condoleezza Rice explained in the
context of Iraq and Iraqi President Saddam
Hussein’s alleged nuclear weapons program,
“The problem here is that there will always
be some uncertainty about how quickly he
can acquire nuclear weapons. But we don’t
[want] the smoking gun to be a mushroom
cloud.”40
The unilateralist view emphasizes indi-
vidual states as the key unit of analysis,
making security decisions based on self-
centered calculations of relative power in a
largely anarchic international system. Just
as strict constructionists are suspicious of
military action, unilateralists do not fully
trust international law and organizations.
While strict constructionists focus on
process, unilateralists rely on a subjective
standard for judging WMD capabilities and
threats: does a state in good faith perceive
sufficient threat of WMD attack from an
adversary state? This standard allows states
to rely on their own independent judgments
about the capabilities and threats posed by
others and accepts uncertainty and ambi-
guity as an inherent feature of intelligence.
As the Bush administration’s 2006 National
Security Strategy document stated: “There
will always be some uncertainty about the
status of hidden programs.”41 To unilater-
alists, threat assessments made by multi-
lateral bodies like the U.N. carry an
unacceptable risk of underestimation, given
the relatively greater weight they assign to
false negatives in the WMD context.
However, the unilateralists’ central prob-
lem in calibrating the use of force under ca-
pability uncertainty lies in their failure to
differentiate reliable and unreliable epistemic
approaches to assessing potential threats.
Thus they fail to create counter-pressure to
“worst case” analysis. Even leaving aside the
prospect of pretextual capability appraisals,
the most worrisome type of unreliable ap-
proach involves treating high-impact threats
as cause for military action, even when there
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is little evidence indicating the threat will be
realized, or when the available evidence sug-
gests a very low probability of occurrence.42
It is dangerous and destabilizing for states to
predicate high-risk military action on low
probabilities or on thin evidence of a threat.
Wars are notoriously fraught with unin-
tended consequences, and military actions
designed to counter dubious threats risk cre-
ating more dangers than they eliminate.
The problem is not that the use of a sub-
jective standard always leads to hypersensi-
tive threat assessments and unwarranted
military actions, but that a subjective stan-
dard sanctions this kind of decisionmaking
and places it on equal legal footing with
more robust assessments, instead of creating
moderating counter-pressure through use-
of-force regulation. If one purpose of a legal
framework in this area is to discourage the
use of irresponsible epistemic processes un-
der uncertain conditions and to reward the
responsible, a system that fails to first dis-
tinguish between the two falls short.
The unilateralist view also suffers from a
legitimacy problem: its subjective standard
is not anchored to rules or assessments
reached through widely-respected or agreed-
upon procedures. Thus unilateral capability
assessments carry important practical disad-
vantages, including the possibility that any
use of force based on them is less likely to
garner international support that may be
important to the success of the intervention.
“[S]tronger agreed factual predicates will
help generate support for action and
strengthen legitimacy.”43 These critiques of
the unilateralist view naturally strengthen
calls for stronger process. But they also raise
the question of whether objective standards
can remedy problems of untethered subjec-
tivity without exclusive reliance on proce-
dural stringency.
The Reasonable Necessity School: A third
approach—and the one I favor—uses a
“reasonable necessity” standard to regulate
the use of force against WMD threats. This
approach embraces multilateral-process so-
lutions when possible, but also favors ob-
jective standards for judging resort to force
outside the U.N. Security Council system.44
While the use of force would remain jus-
tified when the conditions of customary
anticipatory self-defense are met, this ap-
proach attempts to build upon the logic
underlying that doctrine. It seeks to adapt
use-of-force rules to the unique challenges
of WMD threats and proliferation, while
maintaining fidelity to the imminence re-
quirement’s core purposes of allowing the
use of force only when other options have
been exhausted and when waiting poses an
unacceptable risk that the window of op-
portunity to eradicate the threat will close.
These criteria are all judged by objective
standards of reasonableness. Whereas some
unilateralists are distrustful of the U.N.
Charter system, reasonable necessity pro-
ponents generally seek to preserve it, by ar-
ticulating standards to guide U.N. Security
Council deliberations or assertions of self-
defense (as protected by Article 51).45
By analyzing the issue through the per-
spective of a responsible threatened state,
the reasonable necessity approach acknowl-
edges that a state’s threat perceptions will
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likely have more decisional weight than its
commitment to international norms in
cases where the two conflict. The reason-
able necessity approach attempts to reduce
this conflict by bringing the law and the
state’s situation more closely in line, making
use-of-force regulation more context-sen-
sitive. At the same time, like the strict con-
structionist view, it affirms the potential of
law to guide state behavior and places a
similar premium on legitimacy in decision-
making and uses of force.
In doing so, the reasonable necessity
school uses an objective standard for judging
WMD capabilities and threats: Would a
reasonably cautious state have acted in self-
defense on the basis of the available evidence
and its epistemic strength? In assessing rea-
sonableness, this view seeks to identify fac-
tors that a reasonable state would consider
in evaluating a potential threat under capa-
bility uncertainty.
Reasonable necessity advocates calibrate
the risks of false positives and false negatives
differently than do the strict construction-
ists and unilateralists. The latter two strike
their balance primarily through the location
of decisional authority (in the U.N. Security
Council and in individual states, respec-
tively), giving comparatively little attention
to the substance of the internal logic
through which those decisional authorities
reach judgments. In a reasonable necessity
system, that logic is paramount. Capability
assessments guided by objective criteria and
evidentiary rules are the core of this ap-
proach, and their particular configuration
will be the principal determinant of how
the risks of different errors are balanced.
Instead of assigning capability assessments
to an entity in the expectation that its in-
centives and characteristics will produce
judgments that approximate the desired bal-
ance of risks, a reasonable necessity regime
conducts this balancing largely through the
substantive criteria themselves.
Scholar and former senior U.N. official
Michael Doyle, for example, proposes eval-
uating military action against threats along
four dimensions: the lethality of the threat,
the likelihood it will materialize, the legiti-
macy of the proposed action (determined by
reference to traditional just-war principles),
and the legality of both the target state’s do-
mestic and international behavior and the
threatened state’s response. For Doyle, the
U.N. Security Council would remain the
preferred but non-exclusive means of re-
sponse, and he therefore requires exhaustion
of U.N. Security Council remedies prior to
unilateral application, as well as national and
international reporting of the legal analysis.46
Former State Department Legal Adviser
Abraham Sofaer offers a variant, proposing
four factors for use in establishing the rea-
sonableness of resort to force in a given cir-
cumstance: the magnitude of the threat, its
probability of occurring, the exhaustion of
peaceful alternatives, and consistency with
the underlying purposes of the U.N. Char-
ter.47 Neither Doyle nor Sofaer would deny
the influence of decisional authority on out-
comes, but as a method for optimizing the
balance of risks, that is secondary to the sub-
stantive criteria and epistemic analysis those
authorities are tasked with applying.
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This approach to managing false positives
and false negatives should enhance the
transparency of the balancing process
through articulation and application of stan-
dards, allowing for feedback as law evolves
to deal effectively with evolving threats and
conditions. Under the unilateralist and strict
constructionist views, institutional mecha-
nisms mediate between the desired balance
of risks and their actualization, often leaving
the connection between the policy objective
and the outcome unclear. In contrast, rea-
sonable necessity entails ascribing policy in-
terests to various factors and applying them
in a given context of contemplated force.48
As for legitimacy, the reasonable necessity
view holds promise in terms of both its an-
choring to widely acknowledged and agreed-
upon standards and its ability to induce
consensual compliance by conforming to de-
cisionmaking criteria that motivate states in
national security crises. The vitality of the
law governing precautionary self-defense de-
pends upon the ability of this law to adapt to
contemporary challenges like capability un-
certainty in a manner that decisionmakers
and security professionals perceive as sen-
sible. For this task, an objective standard is
promising, because it directly addresses the
same judgments these actors are forced to
make and assesses them in recognizable
terms.49 Moreover, as discussed further be-
low, there are a range of opportunities for a
reasonable necessity regime to work in tan-
dem with the U.N. Security Council and
other institutional processes, especially in
clarifying the legitimate policy priorities that
guide objective standards.
Strict constructionists are quick to object
that in practice, the reasonable necessity
approach collapses into the unilateralist ap-
proach, at least when applied outside of the
U.N. Security Council. Thus, strict con-
structionists argue, their approach offers
the only viable framework to stave off the
unconstrained use of force by states because
bright-line triggers of legal authorization
are needed to avoid devolution and manip-
ulation of objective standards into unreli-
able, subjective judgments.50
A related objection is that in practice,
objective standards tend to slide toward
unilateral subjectivity because the reasonable
necessity approach lacks clear decisional au-
thority: from where are the reasonableness
standards derived and by whom and where
are they applied? Strict constructionists say
the U.N. Security Council is obviously the
legal decisional authority; unilateralists see
the individual state as the legal decisional
authority. They both question the legal de-
cisional authority for articulating and apply-
ing objective standards under the reasonable
necessity approach.
Furthermore, one might raise concern
that international use-of-force doctrine
ought to be concerned not merely with the
balance of false positives and negatives but
with the distribution of their harms: that is,
on which parties do the consequences of un-
derestimation or overestimation of threats
fall in decisions about the use of force? If a
state like the United States used force to dis-
arm or prevent the WMD-arming of a re-
gional power, that might be viewed as a way
of externalizing the United States’ own se-
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curity risks onto, for example, smaller states
in that region. Those states must also con-
tend with resulting instability and human-
itarian consequences, let alone the risk of
assessment error borne by the perceived-
hostile state. Any state facing security threats,
but especially a superpower or hegemonic
one, is likely to shift risk elsewhere and to
heavily discount the risk borne by others.51
Law should play a role in checking or regu-
lating those tendencies.
One problem with these objections is that,
as Abraham Sofaer explains, “[S]tates pre-
pared to use force in bad faith are undeterred
by restrictive legal rules.”52 This problem
afflicts the strict constructionist approach as
well as any regulatory scheme that depends
on decentralized international enforcement,
even if it includes centralized adjudication.
In the absence of powerful centralized en-
forcement, any international legal regime
will have to operate under these limitations,
and it remains unproven whether inflexible,
bright-line rules are better suited to the task,
especially when critical facts remain subject
to debate among key international actors.
Moreover, the principal targets of use-of-
force rules include not only actors deter-
mined to disregard international law or
wedded to faulty capability assessments. In
these cases, each of the three approaches is
likely to fare poorly in constraining uses of
force. Use of force rules should also be
geared to those who may be susceptible to
their pull and designed to maximize the
scope of their influence.53
Like much of international law, effective
articulation, application, and enforcement
of reasonable necessity standards are largely
decentralized.54 Legal claims are then eval-
uated through expressions of states and,
increasingly, through international organi-
zations and non-governmental actors, in-
cluding scholars and other opinion-shapers.
Former State Department Legal Adviser
and international law scholar Abram
Chayes makes a similar point when he ex-
plains that “the requirement of justification
suffuses the basic process of choice. There
is a continuous feedback between the
knowledge that the government will be
called upon to justify its action and the kind
of action that can be chosen.”55 While le-
gality is not merely about winning public
support, it does depend heavily on the abil-
ity to defend actions in terms of generalized
principles. “[B]ecause of the very promi-
nence of legal standards as criteria for pub-
lic accounting,” Chayes continues, “failure
to justify on these grounds or an inadequate
legal defence may compromise the justifi-
cation exercise over-all.”56 It is this public
accounting that the reasonable necessity
standards aim to improve.
All of this is not to suggest that objective
reasonableness standards and use of process
to manage capability uncertainty are mutu-
ally exclusive. Quite the contrary: there are
many opportunities for symbiosis.
For all their limitations, multilateral in-
spections regimes should remain an integral
part of an overall system for managing and
reducing capability uncertainty, as they are
a key mechanism for acquiring at least one
important factor: forensic evidence. Instead
of obviating these auxiliary processes, a
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reasonable necessity approach should sup-
plement them with a broader array of evi-
dentiary tools; its objection to the strict
constructionist view is simply directed at
over-reliance on exclusive decisionmaking
procedures and a correspondingly narrow
class of evidence. As explored in the next
section, these additional tools can serve to
reinforce a process regime by partially fore-
closing responses that exploit limitations of
inspections and eliminate the incentive to
cultivate uncertainty for strategic purposes.
In a similar fashion, regulating force
through objective standards should not be
seen as incompatible with the U.N. Security
Council system, and could be complemen-
tary. Under almost any objective reasonable-
ness regime, the U.N. Security Council is
likely to remain the most desirable source of
authorization, and the uses of force it sanc-
tions will remain per se or presumptively
reasonable. Operating in parallel, objective
standards would have significant potential
for reciprocal reinforcement. In addition,
exposing the U.N. Security Council to this
sort of “healthy competition” would help
push its members to deploy their votes and
vetoes on the basis of persuasive reasoning
rather than institutional prerogative. This is
also a promising mechanism for inducing
deliberative use of transparent criteria in the
U.N. Security Council. If faced with a com-
peting assessment that is particular to and
organized by reference to objective stan-
dards, both the Council and its individual
members would be pressured to clarify the
basis for their decisions and explain why they
reached a different conclusion. This process
of bringing the capability judgments of U.N.
Security Council decisions to the surface and
forcing a substantive debate about eviden-
tiary standards is an important step to im-
proving the way use of force rules operate
under capability uncertainty.
There may be other ways to adapt the le-
gal processes central to the strict construc-
tionist view in ways that both support and
constrain a reasonable necessity approach
to force. Michael Doyle, for example, pro-
poses that if a state bypasses the Security
Council in resorting to preemptive or pre-
ventive force, it ought to submit a public
report after the fact to the Security Council,
which would then investigate the justifia-
bility of the action subject to a majority
vote without vetoes.57 Thomas Franck pro-
poses that the Security Council might pre-
authorize remedial actions, including the
use of force in the event of a state’s non-
compliance with certain conditions, and it
might agree to treat determination of non-
compliance as a procedural issue not subject
to veto by permanent members.58 Political
scientists Allen Buchanan and Robert Keo-
hane propose several models for improving
accountability for uses of force. These in-
clude Security Council-appointed impartial
bodies to determine whether an intervener’s
ex ante justification is confirmed ex post and
to assess penalties for improper judgments,
or the adoption of such mechanisms by a
separate coalition of democratic states that
would judge the legitimacy of uses of force
outside the Security Council.59 These pro-
posals share a goal not only of creating a
more policy-appropriate balance and dis-
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tribution of risk but also, through delibera-
tive and adjudicative processes, of exposing
and subjecting to external scrutiny the spe-
cific substantive strands of use-of-force le-
gal analysis. In the case of WMD crises, a
key strand would remain assessment of a
perceived-hostile state’s WMD capability
amid likely factual uncertainty. Bearing in
mind the possible utility of these sorts of
processes, the following section explores
how the content of that assessment might
be filled.
IV. Evidentiary Principles and
Precautionary Self-Defense
The analysis above points to the need forreasonable necessity proponents to ad-
dress epistemic or evidentiary questions: In
a world in which complete clarity or con-
sensus regarding states’ WMD capabilities
is impossible, how should states or collective
security institutions judge capabilities?60
There is a remarkable absence of well-es-
tablished international law analogous to do-
mestic law of “evidence,” even though the
legality or illegality of uses of force often
turns on disputed facts.61 An examination
of evidentiary logic points again toward
symbioses between the objective reason-
ableness approach and a process approach
to regulating force.
One way to assess reasonable certainty
would be to set a specific standard or burden
of proof. In other words, rather than think-
ing about what level of confidence is suffi-
cient on a case by case basis, international
law could include a generally-applicable
threshold that balances the relevant interests
across the set of cases—analogous, for ex-
ample, to the “clear and convincing” stan-
dard in domestic law.62 However, any
minimum threshold must recognize that
both intent and capability are critical to an
overall threat assessment, and that as the
certainty of hostile intent increases, precau-
tionary action might be justified despite high
doubt about capability. The challenging issue
then becomes one of setting a threshold for
sufficient evidence. That calibration depends
on weighing the relative risks of false posi-
tives and false negatives, and on assumptions
about states’ intent. Because these factors
are all in flux, it is hard to develop a single,
fixed standard. Moreover, returning to the
central issue of this chapter: What types of
evidence or judgments should be weighed in
the assessment of the likelihood a state has
or will soon have a WMD capability?
To the extent it is available, forensic evi-
dence of WMD programs is universally rec-
ognized as legitimate, especially if it
withstands public scrutiny. Some scholars
therefore advocate a requirement that evi-
dence be made public. They argue that wide-
spread scrutiny of evidence generally
improves its quality, through debate and
refutation, and enhances its legitimacy.63 A
broader point here is that states should be
obliged to take reasonable steps to validate
their assessments, and their systems for gen-
erating assessments should be scrutinized to
ensure they exercise “due diligence.” How-
ever, one practical problem with this ap-
proach is that key information often cannot
be disclosed publicly without compromising
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critical intelligence sources and methods. A
second, more important limitation is that
forensic evidence alone will rarely be con-
clusive. Significant parts of a public case will
likely need to be inferential, relying on rea-
soned deduction. This raises the question:
What types of inferences are appropriate?
Absent incontrovertible forensic evidence,
states are likely to base their WMD capabil-
ity assessments on what lawyers might term
“propensity” evidence—a regime’s past con-
duct, decisionmaking, or strategic calculus
that shows an inclination towards acquiring
WMD. A critical question for any legal
mode of capability assessment, but especially
for the reasonable necessity approach, is
when and how heavily to credit propensity
inferences. Not for lack of effort, political
scientists have been unable to ascertain the
accuracy of these types of inferences.64 Yet
given the given the dual-use nature of many
components of WMD programs, some re-
liance on the inferred motivations of states
may be unavoidable in interpreting forensic
data points.
In addition, the difficulty of collecting
forensic evidence—suspect states may re-
fuse to allow international inspections or
may withhold a full accounting of their sus-
picious activities—makes it likely that rea-
soned inferences will come into play from a
strategic perspective, if not a legal one, in
appraising WMD capabilities. When and
how should negative inferences drawn from
deliberate failure to disclose information
form part of a reasonable assessment? Put
another way, and returning to the issue of
distribution of risk, under what circum-
stances should the risk of erroneous assess-
ment, and so some burden of persuasion,
be shifted onto the alleged proliferator? It
is common in domestic law to place the
burden of proof on the party with best ac-
cess to information, the one that can pro-
vide it at least cost, or the one that hides or
destroys information.
The notion of shifting some burden of
persuasion—and with it some of the respon-
sibility for false positives—seems especially
appropriate in cases where a regime deliber-
ately tries to mislead regional or global rivals
into thinking its WMD arsenal is more ad-
vanced than it really is. In the case of Iraq,
Saddam’s interference with inspectors was
probably driven in part by his desire to proj-
ect power domestically and regionally by
fostering the perception he had WMD to
hide.65 The Iranian regime may currently be
exaggerating its enrichment capabilities in
order to create a perception that its nuclear
development progress is irreversible.66 This
does not suggest that, when combined with
a requisite assessment of hostile intentions,
a regime’s “boasting” should be sufficient
evidence of capability to justify the use of
force. Rather, it is a factor that ought to help
guide assessments of reasonableness with re-
spect to the capability factor in a use-of-
force legal equation. Despite the cautionary
lesson of misjudging Iraq’s WMD, applying
such a principle to WMD capability assess-
ments as part of a reasonableness self-defense
analysis might still promote accuracy in the
long term if states understand that their own
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intransigence may shift the burden of proof
against them.
There are some clear dangers to this bur-
den-shifting approach. It may undermine
incentives for states to sign on to non-pro-
liferation regimes in the first place, or deter
Security Council members from imposing
additional inspections or disclosure require-
ments out of fear those requirements would
later be cited in justifying force. More gen-
erally, any use-of-force regulatory regime
needs to be considered within a broader
international legal context, including its
overlap and interaction with the non-
 proliferation regulatory regime. Although
the frequency with which precautionary
force is used to combat WMD proliferation
will and should almost certainly remain very
low, the basis on which it is authorized will
influence other states’ behavior.
Thus reliance on evidentiary principles
ought to reflect a judgment as to whether
WMD proliferation is best combated with
coercive threats of military force, engage-
ment through international arms control
regimes, or a combination thereof. Work-
ing through the evidentiary issues raised
above will help to reveal these policy ques-
tions lying just below the surface of use-of-
force debates. The question of whether to
infer propensity, for example, turns on judg-
ments about what conditions or behavior
by “bad” states should diminish the benefit
of doubt normally accorded to “good” states
about activities that could signal WMD de-
velopment.67 The burden-shifting question
turns on judgments about how best to pro-
mote adherence to the non-proliferation
regime, a complex matter of international
diplomatic strategy.
The reasonable necessity approach helps
bring these issues into focus, by demanding
analysis of the substantive criteria that
should guide legal uses of force. In a world
of capability uncertainty, these include fac-
tual judgment criteria. The same policy
questions, however, still percolate beneath
the surface in the strict constructionist view.
Even if one ultimately agrees with the strict
constructionists’ approach to regulating
force, the questions prompted by the rea-
sonable necessity inquiry should produce
better-informed collective decisionmaking.
V. Conclusion
G iven the threats the world communityfaces, international legal rules on the
use of force should be adapted to handle
emergent and inescapable intelligence gaps
and uncertainties about adversary states’
WMD capabilities. A reasonable necessity
approach to the use of force against WMD
threats—and with it an objective standard
of assessing WMD capability—operating
as a narrow alternative to formal U.N.
 Security Council authorization, can best
balance and distribute the major, competing
risks. However, the process-oriented ap-
proach of the strict constructionist school
and the more fluid standards of the rea-
sonable necessity school are not mutually
exclusive; they can operate in tandem to
reinforce each other. Enabling them do
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so effectively requires greater attention 
to “evidentiary” issues, which themselves
 reflect underlying policy judgments that
international legal discourse must address.
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